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In this Comment, the author advances the following arguments: (1) the law 
of state immunity does not fall within the common law act of state doctrine as 
enshrined in Art 19 of the Basic Law; (2) as a matter of comity, even though 
the determination of state of immunity is not an act of state, the judiciary and 
the executive should speak with one voice on foreign affairs, and therefore the 
HKSAR courts should observe the doctrine of absolute immunity; and (3) the 
CFA does not have to refer the interpretation of Arts 13 and 19 to the SCNPC 
as the Court would not need to rely or apply either Arts 13 or 19 in resolving 
this dispute as the “one voice” principle on international affairs follows from 
the application of another common law principle and not the common law act 
of state doctrine encapsulated under Art 19. 
Introduction
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) recently handed down 
its long-anticipated decision in Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG 
Hemisphere1 which concerned the law of state immunity in Hong Kong. 
In essence, the CFA (by a 3-2 majority) provisionally held that (1) the 
law of state immunity in Hong Kong was an act of state enshrined under 
Art 19 of the Basic Law; (2) Hong Kong could not, as a matter of legal 
or constitutional principle, adhere to a doctrine of state immunity that 
was at variance with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and therefore 
the doctrine of absolute immunity as practiced in the PRC should apply 
too in Hong Kong; and (3) the CFA had a duty herein to refer the inter-
pretation of Arts 132 and 193 of the Basic Law to the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC) as the CFA needed to 
* Associate Professor, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong. The author is grateful to 
Cora Chan for her interesting comments. All errors are the author’s own.
1 [2011] 4 HKC 151 (CFA).
2 Article 13(1) reads: The Central People’s Government shall be responsible for the foreign 
affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
3 Article 19(3) reads: The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have no 
jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs. 
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interpret these said provisions, which were provisions concerning affairs 
falling within the responsibility of the Central People’s Government or 
the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, when 
adjudicating this case in question. 
The facts and procedural history of the case may be briefl y stated. 
The respondent, FG Hemisphere, was the assignee of the benefi t of debts 
owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo in consequence of two 
ICC arbitration awards made against it. The respondent had sought to 
enforce these awards against money said to be payable in Hong Kong 
to the Congo by China Railway and its subsidiaries. The Congo, China 
Railway and its subsidiaries had sought to resist enforcement on the 
basis that the Congo, as a sovereign state, enjoyed immunity. In the 
High Court, Reyes J held that the transactions between China Railway 
and the Congo were not commercial in nature, and therefore even if 
Hong Kong recognised the restricted doctrine of immunity, the transac-
tion did not fall within the exception to sovereign immunity recognised 
by the restrictive approach. The Court of Appeal, by a 2-1 majority, held 
that the restrictive principle of immunity applied in Hong Kong and the 
Congo was not immune in relation to its commercial transactions. 
In this Comment, I shall advance the following arguments: (1) the 
law of state immunity does not fall within the common law act of state 
doctrine as enshrined in Art 19; (2) as a matter of comity, even though 
the determination of state immunity is not an act of state, the judiciary 
and the executive should speak with one voice on foreign affairs, and 
therefore the HKSAR courts should observe the doctrine of absolute 
immunity; and (3) the CFA did not have to refer the interpretation of 
Arts 13 and 19 to the SCNPC as the Court would not need to rely or 
apply either Art 13 or 19 in resolving this dispute as the “one voice” 
principle on international affairs follows from the application of another 
common law principle4 and not the common law act of state doctrine 
encapsulated under Art 19. 
State Immunity Falls Outside the Common Law Act 
of State Doctrine 
Article 19(3) states that “The courts of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence 
and foreign affairs”. According to the majority judges (Chan PJ, Ribeiro 
4 Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation (HL), [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81. 
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PJ and Sir Anthony Mason NPJ), Art 19(3) is “consistent with the com-
mon law doctrine of act of state”5 and therefore they applied the common 
law understanding of what constituted an act of state. In particular, they 
endorsed the views advanced by the learned editors of Dicey, Morris and 
Collins that the “courts will not investigate the propriety of an act of the 
executive ‘performed in the course of its relations with a foreign state’”.6 
In the same vein, they endorsed Lord Wilberforce’s views in Buttes Gas 
and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) that the act of state doctrine in the context 
of foreign affairs was part of a “more general principle that courts will not 
adjudicate upon the transactions of foreign sovereign states”.7 
Undeniably, the doctrine of state immunity is concerned with the 
relations between states. Therefore the majority judges reasoned that 
state immunity fell within the common law understanding of an act of 
state as enshrined under Art 19. Unfortunately, this is where the major-
ity judges erred at law. 
Certainly, the majority judges were right that state immunity impli-
cated the relations between sovereign states. But that does not mean 
that it automatically falls within the scope of the common law act of 
state doctrine. At common law, even though state immunity does con-
cern the relationship between the state and foreign nations, it has also 
been accepted by judicial practice that the determination of the nature 
and extent of immunity accorded to a foreign state, in the absence of 
legislation, is for the courts to decide. In 1975, the Privy Council of 
Hong Kong in Philippine Admiral v Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd 8 
established that a restrictive approach to immunity should be adopted 
in relation to immunity claimed for vessels arrested in Admiralty in rem 
actions. Subsequently, in 1977, the English Court of Appeal in Trendex 
Trading Corp v Nigeria9 extended the restricted view of immunity to in 
personam cases. Finally, in the House of Lords decision in Playa Larga v I 
Congreso del Partido,10 Lord Wilberforce also endorsed the courts’ earlier 
assumption of the role to defi ne the doctrine of state immunity prior 
to any legislative enactment. In all these cases, even though the judi-
cial policy on immunity implicated the relationship between sovereign 
nations, there was no suggestion that this was an act of state for which 
the courts were denied jurisdiction or that they had exceeded jurisdic-
tion by making such a determination. 
5 See n 1 above at para 345.
6 See n 1 above at para 348. 
7 [1982] A.C. 888 at 931 (HL). 
8 [1977] A.C. 373 (PC).
9 [1977] Q.B. 529 (CA).
10 [1983] 1 A.C. 244 (HL).
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Assuming that the majority judges in FG Hemisphere were indeed 
applying the common law doctrine of act of state, then they must also 
accept its parameters, which had always deemed the law on state immu-
nity as falling outside the scope of this doctrine even though it con-
cerned foreign affairs. The issue therefore is not whether state immunity 
concerns foreign affairs; the issue is whether state immunity is a foreign 
affairs issue that falls within the common law act of state doctrine over 
which any jurisdiction is denied to the courts. If the majority judges were 
indeed endorsing Lord Wilberforce’s defi nition of the common law act 
of state doctrine in Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3), surely to be 
consistent, they must also accept Lord Wilberforce’s endorsement in I 
Congreso del Partido that the courts had the jurisdiction to determine the 
policy on state immunity. Surely, a jurist as eminent as Lord Wilberforce 
could not have been contradicting himself or recanting his view within a 
space of months; his Lordship clearly must not have deemed state immu-
nity as falling within the scope of the common law act of state doctrine. 
Therefore, assuming the majority judges were applying the common law 
act of state doctrine, a fortiori they must also accept that under the com-
mon law, the law on state immunity is a subject-matter that common law 
courts have consistently ruled on and it is not an act of state on which 
courts have been denied jurisdiction to decide. 
Absolute Immunity and the “One Voice” Principle 
Even though state immunity falls outside the scope of the common law 
act of state doctrine, this does not necessarily mean that the Hong Kong 
courts should necessarily apply the restrictive approach to immunity. 
The dissenting judges in FG Hemisphere (Bokhary PJ and Mortimer 
NPJ) argued that the restrictive approach to immunity should apply in 
Hong Kong because this had been the state of affairs under the common 
law as decided by the English courts in Trendex Trading Corp and I Con-
greso del Partido. 
On the other hand, counsel for the Secretary of Justice (as intervener) 
had argued that the PRC government observes the doctrine of absolute 
immunity and therefore the judiciary and the executive should speak 
with “one voice” on foreign affairs issues. The minority judges had two 
inter-related responses to this argument. 
First, the dissenting judges argued that, under the common law, the 
English courts had never consulted the executive on their position on 
state immunity. In fact, Bokhary PJ cited the Privy Council’s warning 
in Philippine Admiral that “if the courts consult the executive on such 
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questions, what may begin by guidance as to the principles to be applied 
may end in cases being decided irrespective of any principle in accor-
dance with the view of the executive as to what is politically expedient”.11 
Unfortunately this is where the minority judges erred. In Philippine 
Admiral, Trendex and I Congreso del Partido, the courts were free not to 
apply an absolute approach to immunity because the executive never 
took a contrary stance. The executive never intervened in any of those 
proceedings and naturally there was no need for the courts to seek guid-
ance from the executive and the judges were free to make their own 
determinations. Whichever way the courts decided, the “one voice” prin-
ciple would not have been infringed as the executive never took a stand. 
However, on the facts in FG Hemisphere, the Secretary of Justice had 
intervened on behalf of the Hong Kong government, and had insisted on 
the application of the doctrine of absolute immunity. If the Hong Kong 
courts had instead applied the restricted approach to immunity, the “one 
voice” principle on foreign affairs would clearly have been violated. 
Second, the minority judges distinguished the House of Lords deci-
sion in Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric  Corporation12 
from which the “one voice” principle was derived, on the basis that the 
facts in FG Hemisphere were wholly different and the “one voice” prin-
ciple was never applied in state immunity cases. In that case, there was 
an application for letters rogatory to obtain evidence from witnesses in 
England for the purposes of an American anti-trust dispute. The Attor-
ney General had intervened and argued that the execution of these 
letters rogatory should be disallowed as the United States courts were 
seeking to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in penal matters which, 
in the view of Her Majesty’s Government, was prejudicial to the sov-
ereignty of the United Kingdom. In response, Lord Wilberforce agreed 
that the “courts should in such matters speak with the same voice as the 
executive”.13 The minority’s attempt to distinguish Rio Tinto Zinc Cor-
poration is wholly unconvincing. The “one voice” principle was never 
applied in the English state immunity cases because the executive never 
intervened to argue a contrary stance. Therefore, the state immunity 
cases do not assist the minority’s position. Herein, the Secretary of Jus-
tice, on behalf of the Hong Kong government, was arguing that the 
absolute approach to immunity should apply. It is also very telling that 
the dissenting judges could not identify a single precedent whereby the 
11 See n 8 above at 399. 
12 [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (HL).
13 Ibid., at 617. 
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courts had adopted a different stance on foreign affairs from the one 
preferred by the executive. 
This author must emphasise that the “one voice” principle is a com-
mon law principle whereby judges display comity by choosing to speak 
with the same voice as the executive on foreign affairs. Courts do so 
out of judicial modesty and not because they are denied jurisdiction to 
decide as they are in those acts of state cases. Lord Wilberforce, who also 
adjudicated over the common law act of state doctrine in Buttes Gas and 
Oil Co v Hammer, never claimed that the dispute in Rio Tinto Zinc Corpo-
ration was an act of state for which the courts were denied jurisdiction to 
hear. The act of state doctrine was never discussed by any of the English 
judges. Instead, this “one voice” principle is a doctrine of comity, unlike 
the common law act of state doctrine which is a jurisdiction-stripping 
mechanism obligatory on the courts. 
Some critics might ask why the Hong Kong courts should speak with 
same voice as the executive branch of government in the PRC. After 
all, they may claim, under the “One Country, Two Systems” model, 
Hong Kong should be free to depart from the position observed by the 
PRC government. This is an interesting question but wholly irrelevant 
on the facts in FG Hemisphere. Herein, the Secretary of Justice had inter-
vened on behalf of the executive branch of government in Hong Kong 
to advance the doctrine of absolute immunity. Therefore, the doctrine of 
absolute immunity is the view taken not only by the PRC government 
but also by the executive branch of government in Hong Kong. Hence, 
the “one voice” principle remains relevant and unassailable. This would 
also mean that if in the future the executive branch of the Hong Kong 
government does not take a stance on this issue, the courts would be free 
to adopt the doctrine of restrictive immunity on its own initiative. 
Therefore, in FG Hemisphere, the majority judges were right for now 
to depart from the common law position on state immunity and argue 
for the absolute approach to immunity in Hong Kong. But they should 
have done so not because state immunity is an act of state but because, 
as a matter of comity, the courts should speak with the same voice as the 
executive on foreign affairs. 
Reference to SCNPC was Unnecessary 
According to the majority judges, state immunity fell within the com-
mon law doctrine of act of state and therefore Art 19 of the Basic 
Law was engaged. In the same vein, state immunity implicated for-
eign affairs for which Art 13 had assigned responsibility to the Central 
People’s  Government (CPG). Since the CFA needed to interpret these 
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said  provisions, which concern affairs falling within the responsibility 
of the CPG or the relationship between the Central Authorities and 
the Region, when adjudicating this case in question, a reference to the 
SCNPC was required. 
As this author has argued earlier, at common law, even though state 
immunity does concern the relationship between states, it has also been 
accepted by judicial practice that the determination of the nature and 
extent of immunity accorded to a foreign nation, in the absence of leg-
islation, is for the courts to decide. If the majority judges in FG Hemi-
sphere were indeed applying the common law doctrine of act of state, 
then they must also accept its scope, which has always deemed the law 
on state immunity as falling outside the parameters of this doctrine even 
though it implicated foreign affairs. The issue therefore is not whether 
state immunity is concerned with foreign affairs; the issue is whether 
state immunity is a foreign affairs issue that falls within the common law 
act of state doctrine over which the courts have been denied jurisdiction 
under Art 19. 
Therefore, since the law of state immunity falls outside the scope of 
Art 19 of the Basic Law, there was no need for the CFA to interpret or 
apply this provision when adjudicating this case and a reference to the 
SCNPC was not required. In the same vein, Art 13 of the Basic Law 
was irrelevant to the adjudication of this case. It merely states that the 
CPG shall be responsible for the foreign affairs relating to the HKSAR. 
It does not state that the CPG shall have sole responsibility over the 
HKSAR’s foreign affairs nor does it defi ne or limit the jurisdiction of 
the courts over foreign affairs. Therefore, again there was no need for 
the CFA to apply or interpret this Basic Law provision for the purposes 
of the adjudication. Therefore, a reference to the SCNPC on this point 
was also unnecessary. In my view, the majority judges were right to apply 
the doctrine of absolute immunity in Hong Kong, but this could have 
been done solely on the basis that under the common law, the courts and 
the executive should speak with the same voice on foreign affairs. Since 
this result followed from the application of another common law prin-
ciple and not the common law act of state doctrine enshrined within the 
Basic Law, no reference to the SCNPC would be required. 
Conclusion
 Certainly, one must appreciate why the CFA felt compelled to apply the 
doctrine of absolute immunity in Hong Kong. The Offi ce of the Com-
missioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the HKSAR had placed 
three letters before the courts, arguing that the doctrine of restrictive 
08-HKLJ- a -Ch-08.indd   399 9/22/2011   5:42:21 PM
400 Po Jen Yap (2011) HKLJ
immunity was inconsistent with the stance taken by China and a con-
trary position adopted in Hong Kong would prejudice the nation’s sov-
ereignty. If the CFA had insisted on applying the doctrine of restrictive 
immunity in Hong Kong, this surely would trigger another constitutional 
crisis and the Court would be quickly rebuked and overruled via a bind-
ing SCNPC Interpretation. 
 Unfortunately, in an attempt to avoid a turf war with the Central 
People’s Government that the CFA knew it could not win, the Court 
had ceded more ground than it needed to. Just because the PRC govern-
ment wanted Hong Kong to observe the doctrine of absolute immunity 
does not mean that the CPG necessarily require the CFA to make a 
reference to the SCNPC on this point. In fact, counsel for the Secre-
tary of Justice did not argue that a reference to the SCNPC was neces-
sary if the courts had applied the doctrine of absolute immunity.14 The 
problem with a reference was that the SCNPC could easily overreach 
and hand down an Interpretation that is broader and more intrusive on 
Hong Kong’s autonomy than the CFA would have conceded on its own 
accord. Surely, the CFA must have entertained this possibility and it 
could easily have, on the basis of the common law “one voice” principle, 
applied the doctrine of absolute immunity, and avoided altogether the 
application of the excluded Basic Law provisions that would trigger the 
SCNPC reference mechanism. 
 It would remain a mystery (for now, anyway) why the majority 
judges decided as they did.15 One can only wait with bated breath for the 
SCNPC’s response and in hope that the CFA’s choice, to take the road 
less travelled by, would make no difference at all. 
14 See n 1above at para 53.
15 For an interesting discussion of the CFA’s interpretive choices, see Cora Chan, “Reconceptual-
ising the Relationship between the Mainland Chinese Legal System and the Hong Kong Legal 
System” (2011) 6(1) Asian Journal of Comparative Law 1 at 22. 
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